Tracing the sign -- Signing the trace -- The messianic without messianism -- Mourning terminable and interminable : law and (commmodity) fetishism -- Justice, law, and Antigone's singular act -- Generalizing the economy of fetishism.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Perloff’s Wittgenstein: W(h)ither Poetic Theory?David Kellogg (bio)Though Marjorie Perloff has been one of the most powerful forces in contemporary poetry studies for some time, her work has not received the critical attention it warrants. Her latest book, Wittgenstein’s Ladder: Poetic Language and the Strangeness of the Ordinary, provides an opportunity for reflection on a body of writing remarkable both in its consistency and its constant reinvention. Indeed, reading (...) Perloff through Wittgenstein’s Ladder throws her other work over the last twenty years into a new light, as many concepts crucial to her vocabulary—not only theory but also modernism, artifice, avant-garde—are here turned around and forced into new roles. To ask whether and to what extent Wittgenstein’s Ladder constitutes a break in her career is simultaneously to raise the question of critical and poetic theory.Theory Inside and Out“It is in this sense that grammar may be said to replace theory,” writes Marjorie Perloff in the introduction to Wittgenstein’s Ladder [18]. The sense in question is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s, or rather the sense of the late (post-1929) Wittgenstein inflected through Perloff’s post-poststructuralist sensibility. As the sentence preceding this remarkable claim puts it: “For although the later Wittgenstein was to argue that grammar is precisely the key to understanding a given proposition, that there is no essence above and beyond a specific grammatical structure, one nevertheless must ‘distrust’ grammar in the sense of interrogating it as stringently as possible” [17–18].Of course, formulations of theory as a style of distrust have been a commonplace in theoretical discourse for some time. It would not be difficult to argue that Perloff’s explicit advocacy of grammar through Wittgenstein—whose philosophy, she argues, “is indeed intentionally ‘antiphilosophical,’ its purpose being precisely to determine in what circumstances philosophy should be ‘against’ philosophy and why” [12]—is of a piece with recent attempts to think the limits of theory in theory itself. But such a reduction would seriously misread Perloff’s project. We would do well to question, for example, the obvious similarities between Perloff’s description of a duplicity in the project of grammar/theory and the model it might be taken as at once pointedly evoking and evading, Paul de Man’s now-classic essay “The Resistance to Theory.” Despite their apparent similarities, the startling claims of Wittgenstein’s Ladder have little in common with de Man’s suggestion that “resistance may be a built-in constituent of [theoretical] discourse,” and that “the polemical opposition, the systematic non-understanding and misrepresentation, the unsubstantial but eternally recurrent objections, are the displaced symptoms of a resistance inherent in the theoretical enterprise itself” [12].For one thing, de Man explicitly distances his conception of a theoretical project deeply threatening to the claims of knowledge from one rooted in concepts of grammar: [End Page 67][A]s long as it remains grounded in grammar, any theory of language, includ-ing a literary one, does not threaten what we hold to be the underlying principle of all cognitive and aesthetic linguistic systems. Grammar stands in the service of logic which, in turn, allows for the passage to the knowledge of the world. The study of grammar, the first of the artes liberales, is the necessary pre-condition for scientific and humanistic knowledge. As long as it leaves this principle intact, there is nothing threatening about literary theory. The continuity between theory and phenomenalism is asserted and preserved by the system itself. Difficulties occur only when it is no longer possible to ignore the epistemological thrust of the rhetorical dimension of discourse, that is, when it is no longer possible to keep it in its place as a mere adjunct, a mere ornament within the semantic function.[14; emphasis added]In other words, de Man places grammar opposite the project of criticism, which he identifies with rhetoric and ultimately with reading. What de Man refers to as “the latent tension between rhetoric and grammar” is resolved decidedly in favor of the former: “the grammatical decoding of a text leaves a residue of indetermination that has to be, but cannot be, resolved by grammatical means, however... (shrink)

This is the second volume of philosophical essays by one of the most innovative and influential philosophers now writing in English. Containing thirteen papers in all, the book includes both new essays and previously published papers, some of them with extensive new postscripts reflecting Lewis's current thinking. The papers in Volume II focus on causation and several other closely related topics, including counterfactual and indicative conditionals, the direction of time, subjective and objective probability, causation, explanation, perception, free will, and rational (...) decision. Throughout, Lewis analyzes global features of the world in such a way as to show that they might turn out to supervene on the spatiotemporal arrangement of local qualities. (shrink)

Many years ago, C.B. Martin drew our attention to the possibility of ‘finkish’ dispositions: dispositions which, if put to the test would not be manifested, but rather would disappear. Thus if x if finkishly disposed to give response r to stimulus s, it is not so that if x were subjected to stimulus r, x would give response z; so finkish dispositions afford a counter‐example to the simplest conditional analysis of dispositions. Martin went on to suggest that finkish dispositions required (...) a theory of primitive causal powers; there, I think, he was mistaken. All that they require is an improved conditional analysis, and this improved analysis can be built upon whatever treatments of properties and of laws we may favour on other grounds. (shrink)

Vygotsky measured his ‘zone of proximal development’ in years. To do this, he needed a scheme of age periods, and a set of tasks that could diagnose the next age period without defining it. In this paper, we compare the age periods in his late lectures with Halliday’s categories of logico-semantic expansion as used by three adolescent writer/speakers. We find that the tendency to elaborate and embed clauses grows with expertise, while the tendency to tell stories wanes. We take this (...) as evidence of the development of synoptic-dynamic complementarity in adolescents – and also in the theories of Halliday and Vygotsky. (shrink)

This article explores Judith Butler’s reinterpretation of Hannah Arendt’s work in terms of the question of dispossession. By paying attention to the changes in voice and tone in Arendt’s work, Butler has brought forward a reading of Arendt that we have not seen before, and one that we have maybe never needed so much.

This article explores Judith Butler’s reinterpretation of Hannah Arendt’s work in terms of the question of dispossession. By paying attention to the changes in voice and tone in Arendt’s work, Butler has brought forward a reading of Arendt that we have not seen before, and one that we have maybe never needed so much.

Vygotsky measured his ‘zone of proximal development’ in years. To do this, he needed a scheme of age periods, and a set of tasks that could diagnose the next age period without defining it. In this paper, we compare the age periods in his late lectures with Halliday’s categories of logico-semantic expansion as used by three adolescent writer/speakers. We find that the tendency to elaborate and embed clauses grows with expertise, while the tendency to tell stories wanes. We take this (...) as evidence of the development of synoptic-dynamic complementarity in adolescents – and also in the theories of Halliday and Vygotsky. (shrink)

This paper considers the traditional debate about Marx and justice in light of Jacques Derrida's recent text, Spectres of Marx Specifically, I treat Derrida's consideration of the Marxist notion of justice in terms of the problematic of time. Following Derrida, I suggest that while much of the history of Marxism relies on a teleological and Hegelian understanding of time‐becoming‐history, the Marxist critique of justice is actually made possible by what Derrida calls a ‘messianic’ notion of time; one wherein history does (...) not come to an inevitable and predictable end, but rather breaks away to begin a whole new history. I conclude that the outcome of Derrida's analysis is that our responsibility as Marx's heirs is to resist the dogmatism inherent in the former logic, and to heed the normative call of the latter. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Why Gun Control Matters The Initial Entitlement Problem The Regulatory Power Dangerous‐possessor Gun Control Strict Gun Control Guns as Environmental Toxins Gun Prevalence as a Social Cause of the US Homicide Rate How Many Guns? America's Homicide Rate Guns and Social Causation of the Homicide Rate Mechanism in Causal Accounts Mental Causation The Paradox of Gun Control and Reasonable Policies Conclusion Acknowledgments.

In purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art.Every physician-patient encounter is a conflict of interest. Every physician-payer encounter is also a conflict of interest.Wide-spread criticism of the pharmaceutical industry’s extravagant marketing practices and some doctors’ undignified, even appalling eagerness to stuff themselves, their pockets and their offices with the industry’s “stuff,” prompted physician groups, the drug and device industry itself to institute reforms designed better to limit industry influence on physicians.But according to Troyen Brennan and his (...) coauthors, the reforms, while reducing some of the most egregious instances of industry influence peddling and physicians’ self-debasement, were doomed fundamentally, for three reasons. First, they were based on common sense but incorrect assumptions about the mechanism of industry influence and on myths about the efficacy of disclosure as an ethical disinfectant. Second, they relied on voluntary adherence and so failed to pinpoint responsibility for monitoring compliance and enforcement. (shrink)

Departing from hypothetical dilemmas and drawing on examples from law, this paper offers a pragmatist account of normative induction that characterizes moral particularism and generalism as stages of inquiry into ethical problems, rather than rival accounts of moral knowledge and motivation. Pragmatism’s response to analytical moral theory lies in understanding the transformative nature of John Dewey’s social continuum of inquiry. The continuum is unrecognized in the analysis of hypothetical dilemmas, like the trolley problem, but can clearly be seen in studies (...) of law. Real moral dilemmas represent actual conflicts, of which the dimensions emerge through experience and the solution cannot be addressed through the analysis of cleverly balanced moral puzzles. Repeated over time, real problems drive the consensual formation and revision of social practices and the predication of general moral rules and principles. Ethical particularism holds that the evaluative cannot be “cashed out” propositionally, and that it is descriptively “shapeless.” It fails to recognize that real moral problems occur in a continuum, and at first encounter a shapeless particularist context of seemingly unlimited non-moral properties. Normativity is driven by repetition of similar situations toward shared practices and descriptive predication. Rather than a Dancian retention of epistemic status by defeated reasons, this illustrates retirement of relevant properties and accompanying reasons, transformation of the reasons environment, and a pluralist normative ontology. (shrink)

In the name of restoring professionalism, an influential group of physician-educators have urged academic medical centers to take the lead in purging the house of medicine of the conflicts of interest created by industry's marketing. I argue that this revivalist movement is misguided, uses “conflict of interest” as an epithet, creates counter-productive incentives, and fails the duty to prepare physicians for ethical engagement with their commercial partners in patient care.

This book develops John Dewey's broad conception of social conflict as a natural process of discovery and preference adjustment, resolving Kenneth Arrow's famous theorem of the impossibility of ordering diverse preferences through voting. It addresses the nature and resolution of today's urgent problems and political polarization.

In his 1992 text ‘Force of Law’ Jacques Derrida makes the radical claim that the aura of law’s legitimacy is always achieved by virtue of an ideological sleight of hand. I argue that the radicality of this claim does not lie in its abandonment of the rule of law, nor is this claim a call to political quietism. Rather, Derrida charges us with the responsibility of interrogating the moments of law’s force or ideology. Following this suggestion I argue that one (...) important way that the law has maintained its aura of legitimacy is on the basis of an ideological appeal to the presumed natural or transparent nature of sexual complementarity. Through a reading of Hegel’s use of the Greek mythological Antigone, I argue that one important way that the im possibility of the necessary encounter between law and the singular case has been covered over, is by way of an appeal to the presumed naturalness of heterosexuality. The conclusion of my analysis is that the illusion of law’s legitimacy is not necessarily achieved with reference to the feminine, nor by virtue of an appeal to the transparency of heterosexuality, but it is no coincidence that it has been achieved in this way so often in the history of political philosophy either. However, no matter how the illusion of law’s legitimacy is achieved, it will always require a sleight of hand; it will always be ideological and therefore political. This analysis therefore serves as an example of how deconstruction can be mobilized as much more than a philosophical meditation on the impossibility of justice; rather, it offers a mode of analysis of critical importance to social and legal theorists. Key Words: Antigone • Derrida • Hegel • sexual difference. (shrink)

Judith Butler and Catherine Malabou’s recent exchange, ‘You Be My Body for Me: Body, Shape and Plasticity in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit’, is remarkable because in their rereading of Hegel’s famous lord and bondsman parable, rather than focusing on recognition, work, or even desire, Butler and Malabou each wonder about how Hegel contributes to a new way of thinking about ‘having’ a body and how coming to ‘be’ a body necessarily involves a kind of dispossession. Butler and Malabou’s reading of (...) Hegel is congruent with a current shift on the left away from a liberal politics of recognition to a Marxist analytic of dispossession: a move, in other words, away from liberal ‘solutions’ of redistribution – of either goods or recognition – towards thinking through issues of settler colonialism, forced migration and empire. Butler and Malabou’s piece points towards the insight that Hegel’s parable must be thought in terms of the political history of possessive individualism, and so in terms of the history of juridically defined property relations; the history of regarding both the body and the land as property. The ‘two valences’ of dispossession, in other words, refers in fact to a logic of property relations, one between those who ‘have’ property and those who are juridically defined as propertyless. (shrink)

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, is considered by many to be the most influential American jurist. The voluminous literature devoted to his writings and legal thought, however, is diverse and inconsistent. In this study, Frederic R. Kellogg follows Holmes's intellectual path from his early writings through his judicial career. He offers a fresh perspective that addresses the views of Holmes's leading critics and explains his relevance to the controversy over judicial activism and restraint. Holmes is shown to be an original (...) legal theorist who reconceived common law as a theory of social inquiry and who applied his insights to constitutional law. From his empirical and naturalist perspective on law, with its roots in American pragmatism, emerged Holmes's distinctive judicial and constitutional restraint. Kellogg distinguishes Holmes from analytical legal positivism and contrasts him with a range of thinkers. (shrink)

Despite the frequent use of the term systems by academicians and management practitioners, there is little agreement as to what the term really means. Experts in different fields talk about accounting systems, production systems, electronic data processing systems, market systems, financial systems, reward and motivation systems, and so on, but the student of management is confused by the nebulous and, at times, seemingly contradictory terms. This article uses the term Systems Approach as a convenient handle to pull together a few (...) basic ideas about the systems concept. Systems Approach organizes one's thinking to understand more clearly the complexity of a real world phenomenon. It consists of two main parts: (1) Systems Thinking (ST), and (2) Information Technology (IT). ST provides the knowledge for developing a Theory of Systems, such as General Systems Theory and Cybernetics, while IT supplies the tools for testing and improving this theory. The relationship between the two parts is a complementary one. Advances in theory lead to the development of better technology, while improvement in technology makes theory development easier and more reliable. (shrink)

“Strict gun control” has no clear meaning,so it is necessary to clarify it.I define SGC as an array of legally sanctioned restrictions designed to impose firearm scarcity on the general population. SGC’s public policy goal, gun scarcity, commonly rests on the predicates that “dangerous criminal control” is not the central problem for reducing the problem of criminal gun violence but rather that it is the social prevalence of the distinctively-lethal instruments by which both supposedly “good citizens” as well as violent (...) criminals inflict a staggeringly high percentage of injury and death.Professor Zimring is one SGC’s most distinguished, prolific and comprehensive theorists. He has advocated for handgun scarcity among the general population since at least 1969. (shrink)

“Strict gun control” has no clear meaning,so it is necessary to clarify it.I define SGC as an array of legally sanctioned restrictions designed to impose firearm scarcity on the general population. SGC’s public policy goal, gun scarcity, commonly rests on the predicates that “dangerous criminal control” is not the central problem for reducing the problem of criminal gun violence but rather that it is the social prevalence of the distinctively-lethal instruments by which both supposedly “good citizens” as well as violent (...) criminals inflict a staggeringly high percentage of injury and death.Professor Zimring is one SGC’s most distinguished, prolific and comprehensive theorists. He has advocated for handgun scarcity among the general population since at least 1969. (shrink)

A recent New York Times/CBS poll shows that nearly 80 percent of respondents think the American “health care system is headed toward a crisis because of rising costs.” Indeed, the public has become well acquainted with ominous-looking graphs that detail the nation’s health care spending. The increasingly steep slope of the graph showing the percentage of gross domestic product spent on health care invites tongue-in-cheek projections for when health care spending will finally consume it all.High aggregate health care expenditures result (...) from the low prices individuals pay for coverage. On average, patients pay only five cents out-of-pocket for every dollar of hospital charges they generate. The remainder is paid by private or public health insurance. Patients pay slightly more for physicians’ services—nineteen cents on each dollar. For health care of all types, patients pay approximately twenty-four cents on each dollar. With individuals paying what amount to fire sale prices for health care, it should come as no surprise that they purchase a great deal of coverage. (shrink)

… no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient, for the true physician … is not a mere money-maker.A physician shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, except in emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in which to provide medical care.[We] are agents. Our constitution is put in our power. We are charged with it; (...) and therefore are accountable for any disorder or violation of it.Conscience is a sense of duty that inhibits and prompts conduct by threatening distress for noncompliance. Liberty—to live according to the dictates of one's conscience and not to be compelled to live in... (shrink)

Pragmatism, Logic and Law traces legal pragmatism as a distinct logical theory originated in late 19th century America, covering various issues, cases, personalities, and relevant intellectual movements within and outside law. It addresses pragmatism’s relation to legal liberalism, natural law, critical legal studies (CLS), and neopragmatism.

This paper argues that insofar as the ‘translation’ of deconstruction in America has become a discourse on the sacred, it mis‐recognizes what Derrida calls the trace, and identifies it as the radical outside to thought, or as ‘God’. The ‘trace’ on Derrida's account is indeed unknowable, but it is not the radical outside of thought. Rather, it is a disruptive force that is internal to thought. Reconstructive analyses investigate the way that thought is breached, and necessarily so, by what thought (...) cannot think. This breach, this unsignifiable opening, is intolerable to philosophical undertakings because philosophy must totalize; this is what philosophy does. Following Walter Benjamin, I argue that translation is possible, precisely because of this breach. Thus, just because this breach or opening is intolerable to thought or to philosophy does not prevent it from happening. On Jacques Derrida's analysis, this opening has a name: it is deconstruction. To this extent, those variants of ‘deconstruction in America’ which misrecognize the trace as God, miss the very political force of deconstruction in the first place, which is to say, a philosophical undertaking which thematizes the intolerability of refusing what philosophy does and must do.The breach in thought is precisely what Walter Benjamin suggests is untranslatable. It cannot be communicated by any sign. Notwithstanding the great difference between Benjamin and Hegel's political commitments, comparing Benjamin's work on the untranslatability of language's ‘languageness’ to Hegel's semiological theory is instructive. It establishes that both thinkers argue that the practice of language should be the practice of learning each word as though it were a proper name. Each argues in their own way that the practice of language should erase the trace. It is precisely this erasure — the identification of the trace as radically exterior to thought ‐ that covers over what is at stake, not simply philosophically, in an investigation into the breach of language, but what is at stake politically. What is at stake politically is what Derrida calls the ‘risk of absolute surprise’ which is nothing less than the risk of a political philosophy with no guarantee. (shrink)

In this lecture, given on 16 June 2004, the author expounds on the definition of Matter and Form in the science of Kabbalah, and the boundaries of our perception of the two. He also explains about the difference between the perspective of Kabbalah and the perspective of conventional science with regard to one's perception of reality. The last section of the lecture touches on the essence of spiritual perception (attainment) and the way by which it is enhanced.

Nineteenth-century references to the syllogism by J. S. Mill and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. reveal a distinct approach to the logic of inference in the formative years of pragmatism. In the latter may be found an element of the emergence of generals from particulars. Fallibilism in law and science reflects their social dimension as part of the communal ordering of experience. This implies a distinct approach to uncertainty, as experience yet to be integrated within a developing system of classification.

The three faces of Francesco Petrarca -- Erasmus: the man in the middle -- Machiavelli and political realism -- Thomas More: the king's good servant but God's first -- Castiglione: a gentleman in Urbino -- Rabelais and the wisdom of laughter -- Montaigne and the wisdom of experience -- Cervantes: life as literature -- Shakespeare.

A travers la Vie de Lutgarde d’Aywières (1182/1183-1246) rédigée par Thomas de Cantimpré (1200- v. 1270), il s’agit d’analyser le réseau de relations tissées par cette cistercienne du diocèse de Liège – vraisemblablement une ancienne mulier religiosa – en insistant d’une part sur les tensions qui ont pu émerger dans le saeculum et au cloître et, d’autre part sur les cercles d’amitié tracés par la moniale. L’étude de ces deux types de relations permet de mettre en évidence les rapports de (...) genre à l’œuvre et leurs enjeux (corps et esprit) et conduit à la conclusion que dans ce contexte – cadre monastique et vraisemblablement béguinal du diocèse de Liège au XIIIe siècle – la hiérarchie sociale se construit non pas tant à partir du genre qu’en fonction de la dichotomie science divine révélée/savoir sacré acquis. (shrink)

This book presents the work of Polish and American philosophers about Poland's transition from Communist domination to democracy. Among their topics are nationalism, liberalism, law and justice, academic freedom, religion, fascism, and anti-Semitism. Beyond their insights into the ongoing situation in Poland, these essays have broader implications, inspiring reflection on dealing with needed social changes.

Dieses von mir im J. 1924 behandelte Papyrusbruchstück wurde 1927 von v. Wilamowitz berücksichtigt. Er hält meine Zurückfuhrüng des Bruchstückes auf Antiphon für sehr ansprechend und auch meine Erklärung für treffend; die Ergänzungen befriedigen ihn nur zum Teil. Letzteres muss ich ihm unbedingt zugeben. Leider sind alle kleinen Fragmente des Papyrus sowie die Zz. 1–6 des Fr. B bei dem Hinüberführen aus England nach Amerika spurlos verschwunden und somit fiir die Wissenschaft auf immer verloren; es ist also nicht mehr möglich (...) zu beurteilen, ob ich Recht hatte, als ich die Zz. 14–15 des Fr. A mit dem Fr. F vereinigte. Dagegen ist Col. II. des Fr. A glücklicherweise erhalten; Prof. W. L. Westermann legte eine ganz hervorragende Freundlichkeit an den Tag, indem er mir zuerst eine photographische Aufnahme davon zusandte und dann meine Lesung an der Hand des Originals prüfte. Bei dem näheren Studium der Photographie bemerkte ich, dass sowohl Hunts Lesung der Z. 7 wie auch meine fruhere durch diese falsche Lesung ins Leben gerufene Erganzung ganz unmöglich sind. Auf der Photographie las ich Z. 7 t περ[ι] επ[ ]ηδ‐‑, und teilte dieses Ergebnis W. L. Westermann mit. Nachdem er in das Original noch einmal eingesehen hatte, antwortete er mir darauf; ‘Das ist die richtige Lesung. Es ist absolut sicher.’ Zu der scheinbar nächstliegenden Ergänzung Περ[] έπ[ιτ]ηδ[ευ]μάτων, die auch ich im ersten Augenblick für passend hielt, kam Westermann, nachdem ihm mein Vorschlag zur richtigen Lesung des Textes bekannt worden war, ganz unabhängig von mir; ich glaube trotzdem dass diese Lesung nicht das Richtige trifft. Wir haben doch in Col. II. eine Reihe von Antithesen ; aus περ Υο‐‑ νης ist aber keine Antithese zu έπιτηδεύματα zu konstruieren. Was nun diese Stelle anbetrifft, so ist hier nur die Lesung Υο möglich, keinesfalls aber das von mir a. a. O. vermutete Υα Aus den Resten Υο. νης oder Υο.νης ist allerdings kein griechisches Wort zu erganzen; doch haben die einzelnen Zeilen des Papyrus nicht gleiche Längen, sodass nichts dem im Wege steht, dass Z. nach Υο auch nichts gestanden habe; dann gelangen wir zur Lesung: πε[ρ] Υο[] έπ[ικ]ηδ [ευ]μάτων, d. h. ‘von der Geburt der Menschen sowie von den Bestattungsbrauchen’ —auch hier haben wir dann, wie in alien anderen Antithesen von Col. II. an der ersten Stelleυμξφροντα, an der zweiten ξυμΦέροντα, vgl. Antiphon, P. Oxy. 1364, Col. III., Z. 28: κατμένξναύτοέστινάΠων. (shrink)